"Anti fast-fashion" Act of 8 July 2026: influencers facing a firm ban with still uncertain contours.

Act no. 2026-602 of 8 July 2026 aiming to reduce the environmental impact of the textile industry has been published in the Official Journal. Among the measures adopted, one provision directly concerns the law of commercial influence: Article 7 outright prohibits influencers from promoting products and brands falling within ultra-express fashion, on pain of an administrative fine of up to 100,000 euros, from 1 January 2027.

The ban is firm in principle and severe in its sanction. It nevertheless suffers from a congenital weakness: no one yet knows, with certainty, which brands will be concerned.

The legal definition of ultra-express fashion rests on unquantified criteria whose concretisation is entirely referred to a decree of the Conseil d'État, all under the close scrutiny of a European Commission that has already voiced its reservations. In other words, the essentials are still to be written.

We will examine successively the content of the ban imposed on influencers (I) and then the persistent indeterminacy of its scope (II).

I. A ban unprecedented in principle, severe in its sanction.

A. A new sectoral ban inserted into the commercial influence Act.

Article 7 of the Act of 8 July 2026 proceeds by inserting a paragraph IV bis into Article 4 of Act no. 2023-451 of 9 June 2023 framing commercial influence and combating the abuses of influencers on social networks.

The choice of vehicle is not incidental. Article 4 of the 9 June 2023 Act concentrates the sectoral prohibitions and restrictions on promotion applicable to persons carrying out the activity of commercial influence by electronic means: cosmetic acts and procedures posing health risks, incitement to therapeutic abstention, nicotine products, promotion involving non-domestic animals, risky financial contracts, crypto-asset services and crypto-assets outside approved or authorised advertisers, subscriptions to sports betting advice or tips, regulated communications on gambling. Ultra-express fashion therefore extends an already substantial list.

One element deserves emphasis. Until now, sectoral bans rested essentially on the protection of public health, savings, minors or wildlife, that is, on an identifiable risk to consumers or to an interest directly exposed by the promoted content.

For the first time, a promotional ban is founded on the overall environmental footprint of a consumption business model, independently of any danger the product would pose to its buyer. This shift in the underlying rationale is not neutral on the level of principles: it will likely feature in the arguments exchanged should the conformity of the scheme with freedom of expression and freedom to conduct a business come to be debated.

B. A ban of remarkable breadth.

The new IV bis of Article 4 of the 9 June 2023 Act is drafted in particularly encompassing terms. What is prohibited is "any promotion, direct or indirect, of products falling within the practice of ultra-express fashion defined in Article L541-9-1-1 of the Environmental Code and of brands using this practice", and this "whether for consideration or free of charge, whatever the nature of the consideration".

The ban first targets "direct or indirect" promotion. This will therefore cover not only overtly declared product placements but also the more insidious formats that make up the daily bread of influencer marketing in the fashion sector: hauls, those videos unboxing massive orders, commented try-ons, promo codes slipped into descriptions, affiliate links, or even, at the outer edge, the tagging of a brand on an outfit worn in seemingly purely editorial content.

The border between indirect promotion and the simple freedom of expression of the content creator will be one of the trickiest issues in applying the text, and it would be imprudent to assert today exactly where it will lie. The most plausible analytical grid appears to be the one already applied by the DGCCRF in misleading commercial practices: the existence of consideration, even in kind, and the commercial intent of the content will be decisive, more than its form.

The ban then targets products "and brands". An influencer will therefore not be able to promote the brand itself, its app, its commercial operations or its universe, without even showing a product. This extension to brand promotion neutralises the most obvious circumvention strategies, such as promoting a referral programme or an event operation without reference to a specific item.

The ban finally applies "whether for consideration or free of charge, whatever the nature of the consideration". The precision is critical in practice: gifting, that is, sending products without monetary remuneration, invitations to events, press trips and other benefits in kind fall within the scope of the text.

It also raises, by implication, the question of the truly spontaneous content published without any consideration: on the letter of the text, promotion "free of charge" is prohibited, which could cover the sincere and unsolicited praise of a brand. Such an extensive reading would however clash head-on with freedom of expression, and one may reasonably expect the administration to focus its action on content forming part of a commercial relationship, even an informal one. The point remains uncertain and will require clarification, whether regulatory or judicial.

It should be noted that this special ban is coupled with a general one. Article 6 of the same Act inserts into the Environmental Code an Article L229-61-1 prohibiting, from the same date of 1 January 2027, advertising for products falling within ultra-express fashion as well as advertising directly or indirectly promoting brands using this practice.

Advertisers, agencies and ad networks therefore come under the general law of advertising, while influencers fall under the special text. The overlap of the two schemes reflects the legislator's intent to close off all promotional channels, from the television spot to TikTok content.

C. A dissuasive administrative penalty, applicable from 1 January 2027.

Breaches of the ban imposed on influencers are punishable by an administrative fine capped at 100,000 euros, imposed under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title II of Book V of the Consumer Code, that is, following the administrative fine procedure implemented by the DGCCRF, with prior adversarial procedure and appeal before the administrative court.

The chosen amount aligns the sanction with the administrative fines already faced by influencers for unlawful promotion of risky financial contracts or digital assets, also capped at 100,000 euros. It stands apart from the criminally sanctioned prohibitions of the 9 June 2023 Act, such as the promotion of cosmetic surgery, punished by two years' imprisonment and a 300,000 euro fine.

The choice of the administrative route does not weaken the threat, quite the contrary: the administrative fine is much more flexible for the administration to handle than a criminal prosecution, and the DGCCRF has demonstrated in recent years its determination in monitoring the sector.

Article 7 enters into force on 1 January 2027, as does the general advertising ban of Article 6. The legislator has therefore allowed a period of a little under six months between the publication of the Act and its effective application. This period is short, very short even, if one considers that the centrepiece of the scheme, the Conseil d'État decree, has not yet been published at the time of writing.

II. A scope still largely undetermined.

A. A legal definition resting on unquantified criteria.

The ban imposed on influencers refers, for the definition of its subject matter, to Article L541-9-1-1 of the Environmental Code, created by Article 1 of the Act. Under I of that provision, ultra-express fashion covers "the industrial and commercial practices of producers, within the meaning of Article L541-10, which result in a reduction of the useful life or lifespan of products referred to in 11° of Article L541-10-1 due to the placing on the market of a high number of references of new products and low incentive to repair these products".

The definition first targets "producers" within the meaning of extended producer responsibility law, a notion that encompasses any person who designs, manufactures, handles, processes, sells or imports the products concerned. II of the provision extends the scheme to operators of online interfaces, marketplaces and platforms allowing the distance sale of these products, the practice then being assessed at the level of all references offered by the operator, save for those where it shows that the brand owner is the producer and that the platform is not its main sales channel.

It then rests on two sub-criteria: the placing on the market of a high number of references of new products, on the one hand, and the low incentive to repair those products, on the other. Decisively, these two sub-criteria are cumulative.

This cumulation, introduced in the joint committee, has been analysed by scholars as reducing the scope of the Act from fast fashion undertakings to ultra fast fashion undertakings alone. Herein lies the whole ambiguity of the text: initially conceived against ephemeral fashion in general, it has been progressively tightened to capture only its most extreme forms.

None of these terms is quantified. What is a "high" number of references? At what ratio between the price of a product and the cost of its repair does the incentive to repair become "low"? The Act is silent, and this imprecision has been noted by the most authoritative commentators, who stress that the scope of the Act will depend heavily on its interpretation by the drafter of the implementing decree and by the judge seised of disputes.

B. The Conseil d'État decree, keystone of the scheme.

V of Article L541-9-1-1 of the Environmental Code refers to a decree of the Conseil d'État the task of defining the modalities of application of the text, "in particular the thresholds relating to the number of references of new products and the criteria of low incentive to repair, by brand within the meaning of Article L711-1 of the Intellectual Property Code and by sales channel".

The Government has not concealed its intentions. The Minister for Trade, Serge Papin, publicly stated, on the eve of the joint committee, that the text had been calibrated to protect French companies such as Kiabi, Decathlon, Jules or Etam, as well as European ones such as Zara and H&M, the Asian platforms Shein and Temu remaining the assumed targets of the scheme.

These statements sketch a clear political intent. They do not, however, amount to a norm. Intention is not law, and the decree will have to translate this will into objective thresholds, applicable without distinction to all operators, under the control of the administrative judge. The exercise will be perilous. Thresholds set too high would empty the Act of its substance and would not even reach the targeted platforms; thresholds set too low would catch brands the Government claims it wishes to spare, with obvious political and economic risks.

Moreover, nothing guarantees that operators will not seek to segment their catalogues across several brands or channels to fall under the thresholds, and nothing says that a judge would validate such avoidance practices, scholars having already flagged this circumvention risk and the litigation it promises.

It should be added that the decree itself will be exposed to a double review: the action for annulment before the Conseil d'État, which operators classified as ultra-express will not fail to bring, and, where applicable, priority questions of constitutionality directed against the Act, on grounds of freedom to conduct a business, freedom of expression and the principle of equality. As of today, the outcome of such actions is undetermined, but their probability is very high.

C. The European unknown.

The European dimension of the matter is the second major source of uncertainty. The proposed law, insofar as it enacts technical rules and restrictions on information society services, was notified to the European Commission under Directive 2015/1535. On 29 September 2025, the Commission addressed to France two detailed opinions accompanied by observations, questioning the compatibility of the advertising ban with Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce and pointing to risks of contradiction with the Digital Services Regulation (DSA), as well as a risk of discrimination against operators established in other Member States.

The legislator has partially taken account of these criticisms. The final text contains so-called internal market clauses: Article L541-9-1-1 does not apply to persons established in another Member State of the European Union or party to the European Economic Area, and the general advertising ban of Article L229-61-1 is set aside for media service providers under the jurisdiction of another Member State as well as for information society services established in another Member State, save for the implementation of the derogation procedures provided for by Directives 2000/31/EC and 2010/13/EU.

These exclusions, imposed by Union law, sketch a paradox that has not escaped anyone: an ultra fast fashion operator judiciously established in another Member State could claim the benefit of the internal market clause, unless France activates the derogation procedures on a case-by-case basis, the implementation of which is cumbersome.

The issue rebounds on the ban imposed on influencers. It admittedly bears on the influencer himself and not on the brand, which makes it less directly vulnerable to the country-of-origin principle. It nonetheless remains that the definition of ultra-express fashion, to which Article 7 refers, is affected by these exclusions, and that the articulation between the promotional ban and the European status of the promoted brand will raise formidable interpretive difficulties.

As things stand, three scenarios remain open: full and complete application of the scheme if the decrees are adopted in terms consistent with Union law; a truncated application, national courts setting aside the provisions deemed contrary to European law in the first litigation; a more frontal challenge in the event of infringement proceedings. No one can seriously predict which will prevail. What can be said, on the other hand, is that the position of the European Commission will weigh directly on the content of the Conseil d'État decree, and therefore on the effective list of brands whose promotion will be banned.

Conclusion.

The Act of 8 July 2026 makes France, to our knowledge, the first Member State of the European Union to prohibit influencers from promoting ultra-express fashion. The intention is clear; the law much less so.

Between a deliberately loose legal definition, a Conseil d'État decree that will concentrate the essential stakes, and a European Commission whose detailed opinions already weigh on the economy of the scheme, the exact scope of the ban remains, to date, undetermined.

For influence professionals, wait-and-see would be the worst strategy. The sanction is heavy, the deadline is close, and the experience of the 9 June 2023 Act shows that the DGCCRF does not leave new texts as a dead letter.

The next six months must be used to audit partnerships, secure contracts and organise rigorous monitoring of the forthcoming decree: it is in that regulatory text, and not in the political statements of the moment, that the list of brands with which collaboration must cease will be read.

Beyond the influence sector, the Act opens up a broader worksite. The Government will have to submit reports to Parliament on the extension of the carbon border adjustment mechanism to textile products and on mirror measures at import, while European texts on the eco-design and durability of textile products are being negotiated in Brussels. The regulation of ultra-express fashion is only just beginning, and it is not excluded that the French scheme, pioneering and fragile at once, will serve as a test bed for a European regulation which alone will be able to guarantee its full effectiveness.